CA (Crim Div) (Simon LJ, Cutts J, Eady J)
12 February 2020
In a rape trial where the central issue was credibility, the judge had been entitled to permit the prosecution to adduce evidence of a defence witness’s bad character under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100(1)(b). The fact that the witness had been convicted of serious sexual offences might fairly be regarded as providing an explanation of why he might be prepared to lie to assist a friend accused of similar offences.
CA (Crim Div) (Fulford LJ, Spencer J, William Davis J)
19 December 2019
It was for the defence at trial to take decisions as to whether to use or act on disclosed unused material, and a failure to inspect such material was unlikely to justify a later application, following conviction, for it to be introduced as fresh evidence. The court emphasised that only in exceptional circumstances would evidence be admitted that could have been adduced at trial.
CA (Crim Div) (Lord Burnett LCJ, Sweeney J, Sir Roderick Evans)
29 November 2019
In an indecent assault trial which turned on the comparative credibility of the complainant and the defendant, the judge should have given a full good-character direction in respect of the defendant. His failure to do so, coupled with his direction that the jury should treat the unchallenged evidence of the defendant’s character witnesses with caution, simply because they knew him well, rendered the defendant’s conviction unsafe.
CA (Crim Div) (Simon LJ, Picken J, Swift J)
13 June 2019
A trial judge had been entitled to admit bad character evidence following a Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(e) application by an accused’s co-defendant, as going towards the accused’s propensity to tell the truth, despite having refused the prosecution’s s.101(1)(d) application to admit the same bad character evidence due to its weaknesses.
CA (Crim Div) (Green LJ, Soole J, Judge Walden-Smith)
16 January 2019
A judge had not erred in admitting evidence of a defendant’s previous convictions during a trial for kidnapping, rape and assault as rebuttal evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(g) against the defendant’s attack on the complainant’s credibility.
CA (Crim Div) (Hallett LJ, Stuart-Smith J, Sir Roderick Evans)
16 October 2018
The court considered issues relating to the impact of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.28 and the pre-recorded cross-examination of vulnerable child witnesses, and provided guidance regarding best practice for trial judges and advocates.
QBD (Admin) (Holroyde LJ, Whipple J)
9 October 2018
In dismissing an appeal by way of case stated against an assault conviction, the court questioned the use of a form by magistrates which used a numerical scale to indicate an assessment of witness evidence. The court considered the form to be at best unhelpful and at worst capable of giving rise to misunderstanding and urged the magistrates’ clerk to urgently consider whether it should be amended or used at all.
QBD (Kerr J)
22 March 2018
The Serious Fraud Office was entitled to a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in respect of £4.4 million held in a UK bank account representing the proceeds of sale of the defendant’s shares in a Canadian company which had provided corrupt inducements to foreign officials. The defendant had acquired the shares at a nominal price as part of the company’s corrupt arrangements to induce Chadian officials, including her husband, to procure the grant of oil production rights in Chad.
CA (Crim Div) (Macur LJ, William Davis J, Judge Munro QC)
21 March 2018
Evidence of a step-father’s controlling behaviour towards his wife and step-son had been relevant evidence at his trial for 16 sexual offences against his step-daughter, as his defence was that his step-daughter was lying and exaggerating his controlling behaviour and the evidence was relevant to the issue of her credibility. A total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.
CA (Crim Div) (Hamblen LJ, Edis J, Judge Kinch QC)
1 March 2018
A judge had not erred in refusing a late application to admit expert evidence as to an appellant’s intellectual ability to assess age at his trial for child sex offences. The assessment of age was not a particularly intellectual process and the appellant’s own evidence had been that he had no difficulty with judging age.