QBD (Admin) (Kerr J)
18 June 2020
A district judge had not erred in ordering the extradition of a Romanian national under a conviction European arrest warrant where he knew that criminal proceedings against him had started before he left Romania, he became a fugitive upon his conviction and any delay between the date of the offences and his conviction had not been inordinately long.
Sup Ct (OECS) (Judge Morley QC)
20 May 2020
In some cases it would be appropriate to stay criminal proceedings on the ground of undue delay even where prejudice to the defendant could not be established.
CA (Civ Div) (Sir Geoffrey Vos C, Patten LJ, Males LJ)
18 March 2020
A judge had failed to apply the correct standard of proof when determining the defendants’ counterclaim of dishonest conspiracy against the claimants, and the matter was remitted to a new judge for re-determination.
CA (Crim Div) (Davis LJ, Lewis J, May J)
18 February 2020
The expansive definition of “proceeds of an offence” in the Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No. 36) Regulations 2014 reg.3(2)(c)(ii) strongly pointed to a wide application of the phrase “in relation to property” in another Member State used in reg.11(2)(a).
DC (Dingemans LJ, Spencer J)
6 February 2020
Although accused of serious crimes, two requested persons were discharged from extradition proceedings after India had failed to provide assurances that their potential life sentences would be reducible until 45 minutes before judgment was due to be handed down. India had known that assurances were required and should have indicated to the judge that it intended to seek them, so that a timetable could be prepared.
CA (NI) (Morgan LCJ, Stephens LJ, McCloskey LJ)
8 January 2020
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland gave guidance on the correct approach to sentencing for fraud and theft where an offender was in a position of trust.
DC (Lord Burnett LCJ, May J)
5 December 2019
The court emphasised that general complaints about the operation of a type-approved breath testing device should be addressed to the secretary of state, not used to ground a disclosure application. Defence representatives were responsible for ensuring that experts understood the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Directions, and that the expert reports which they served on behalf of their clients were reliable and admissible. If such reports were to be relied upon for the purpose of seeking further disclosure in relation to a type-approved machine, they should address all the matters identified in R. (on the application of DPP) v Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court  EWHC 3719 (Admin).
QBD (Admin) (Farbey J)
28 November 2019
A requested person’s extradition to Poland for fraud was disproportionate, oppressive due to the passage of time, and breached ECHR art.8. The district judge’s reasoning regarding the fact that the individual was not a fugitive had been unclear, he had erred in finding that the individual had previous convictions for fraud, and he had failed to give adequate weight to the fact that 19 years had passed since the offending.
DC (Males LJ, Jefford J)
6 November 2019
The time limit for bringing criminal proceedings under the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 in reg.41(1)(b), namely that it had to be within six-months of the date that the evidence which the prosecutor thought justified bringing proceedings came to the prosecutor’s knowledge, could be conclusively evidenced by the issue of a certificate under reg.41(2) stating that date. In the absence of fraud, a certificate in proper form which contained no error on its face was not open to challenge by reference to extraneous evidence showing that it was wrong, or even plainly wrong.
CA (Crim Div) (Davis LJ, Edis J, Andrew Baker J)
17 October 2019
A Crown Court judge had erred in discharging an all assets restraint order on the grounds that the substantive criminal proceedings had not been started within a reasonable time for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s.42(7). Although s.42(7) stipulated that a restraint order had to be discharged in such circumstances, the judge’s evaluation of the prevailing circumstances was flawed and her reasoning could not be upheld.